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abstract.  Is the Supreme Court’s legitimacy in crisis? Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman 
argue that it is. In their Feature, How to Save the Supreme Court, they suggest legally radical reforms 
to restore a politically moderate Court. Unfortunately, their proposals might destroy the Court’s 
legitimacy in order to save it. And their case that there is any crisis may fail to persuade a reader 
with different legal or political priors. If the Supreme Court needs saving, it will be saving from 
itself, and from too broad a conception of its own legal omnipotence. A Court that seems unbound 
by legal principle is too powerful a weapon to leave lying around in a democracy; we should start 
thinking about disarmament. 
introduction 
 In the quiet, untroubled days of early 2018, before Justice Anthony Kennedy 
retired, conservative writer Michael Brendan Dougherty published the essay An-
thony Kennedy Can’t Be Allowed to Die.1 No fan of the Justice’s jurisprudence, 
Dougherty nonetheless saw Justice Kennedy as the linchpin of America’s political 
order. His “mercurial” decisions handed partisans on both sides “some victories 
in between their defeats”; they slowed the pace of political combat and even lent 
“the savor of legitimacy to a closely divided country.”2 But were Justice Kennedy 
replaced, and the Supreme Court perceived as “the cat’s-paw of one party,” both 
 
1. Michael Brendan Dougherty, Anthony Kennedy Can’t Be Allowed to Die, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 23, 
2018, 6:15 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/01/anthony-kennedy-swing-vote 
-supreme-court-we-need-him-alive [https://perma.cc/R4R9-PAJQ]. 
2. Id. 
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sides might reach “for extraordinary measures”—court-packing, nulliﬁcation, or 
worse—that might collapse “what’s left of our constitutional regime.”3 
Dougherty had reason to worry. On the right, the 2016 campaign was 
marked by claims that Hillary Clinton would doom the Republic.4 Backed by a 
comfortable majority of Justices, an imperial Clinton Administration could do 
anything—a disaster from which conservatism would never recover.5 Not all legal 
conservatives believed this, of course,6 but enough Americans did to help elect 
Donald Trump as President: more than a quarter of his supporters named the 
Court as their “most important” issue.7 
After Justice Kennedy’s retirement, and after the wrenching conﬁrmation 
process of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, a similar dynamic emerged on the left. Jus-
tice Kavanaugh’s ﬁrst term was relatively free of ﬁreworks, producing more nar-
row victories for liberals than for conservatives.8 But the politics surrounding 
the Court grew only sharper, with claims of “stolen” seats and calls for court-
packing,9 partly out of fear that a conservative majority might undo anything 
progressives achieve.10 Après Kennedy, le déluge. 
No President of either party would appoint a Justice Kennedy today. But in 
How to Save the Supreme Court, Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman suggest 
 
3. Id. 
4. Publius Decius Mus [Michael Anton], The Flight 93 Election, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS (Sept. 
5, 2016), https://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/the-ﬂight-93-election [https:// 
perma.cc/W3RY-EUUJ]. 
5. Hugh Hewitt, Opinion, It’s the Supreme Court, Stupid, WASH. EXAMINER (July 31, 2016, 5:00 
PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/its-the-supreme-court-stupid [https:// 
perma.cc/GQ34-JENF]. 
6. See 2016 Statement, ORIGINALISTS AGAINST TRUMP, https://originalistsagainsttrump 
.wordpress.com/2016-statement [https://perma.cc/NDL3-XXBR]. 
7. Philip Bump, A Quarter of Republicans Voted for Trump to Get Supreme Court Picks—and It Paid 
Off, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp 
/2018/06/26/a-quarter-of-republicans-voted-for-trump-to-get-supreme-court-picks-and 
-it-paid-off [https://perma.cc/L8JA-KA9Y]. 
8. Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, SCOTUS by the Numbers: Liberals Score in More Close Cases, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 28, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week 
/scotus-by-the-numbers-liberals-score-in-more-close-cases [https://perma.cc/7HVC-
JULK]. 
9. Philip Elliott, The Next Big Idea in the Democratic Primary: Expanding the Supreme Court?, TIME 
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://time.com/5550325/democrats-court-packing [https://perma.cc 
/5HP8-TV8R]. 
10. Dylan Matthews, Court-Packing, Democrats’ Nuclear Option for the Supreme Court, Explained, 
VOX (Oct. 5, 2018, 3:49 PM EST), https://www.vox.com/2018/7/2/17513520/court-packing 
-explained-fdr-roosevelt-new-deal-democrats-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/GXB6-
7DUE]. 
supreme court as superweapon 
95 
remaking the Court in something like Justice Kennedy’s image.11 Their radical, 
Constitution-bending reforms are ultimately designed to produce middle-of-
the-road, Kennedyesque decisions. The authors are smart, creative, and dedi-
cated to making the system better; the legal system could use more such trial 
balloons. Yet their proposals—rotating the Court’s membership biweekly or re-
quiring a partisan balance for its Justices—are unfortunately ill-conceived. They 
might end up destroying the Court’s legitimacy in order to save it. 
Indeed, the strangest thing about these proposals is the view that the Court 
needs saving at all. The last three years reﬂect not “an unprecedented legitimacy 
crisis,”12 but a partisan realignment: something that might have occurred nearly 
thirty years ago, had circumstances been slightly different. That it seems like a 
crisis to many people is itself reﬂective of deep problems in our legal culture, 
which too often looks to judges for political guidance rather than for the decision 
of cases under law. 
Maintaining an uneasy peace among warring factions is not, as Dougherty 
pointed out, the Court’s actual job.13 Justice Kennedy himself famously claimed 
the role, calling in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey for 
“the contending sides of national controversy to end their national division.”14 
Needless to say, that did not work; there are no injunctions to stay proceedings 
in the court of public opinion. And any institution that seemed capable of issuing 
them—one powerful enough, and free enough from preexisting legal rules, to 
respond to the felt exigencies of the time—is an institution that political actors 
cannot afford to leave uncaptured. A Court that can do just anything is too pow-
erful a superweapon to leave lying around in a democracy; sooner or later, some-
one is bound to pick it up. Rather than work to put “moderates” at the controls, 
perhaps we should start thinking about disarmament. 
i .  the lottery 
Epps and Sitaraman offer two proposals to place the Supreme Court “above 
politics.”15 The ﬁrst is the “Supreme Court Lottery,” a form of rotation in office. 
It would staff the Court with a new nine-judge panel every two weeks, randomly 
selected among federal appellate judges (all of whom might ﬁrst have to be 
 
11. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 150 
(2019). 
12. Id. at 153. 
13. Dougherty, supra note 1. 
14. 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (plurality opinion). 
15. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 151. 
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renominated and reconﬁrmed).16 The authors hope this rotation would reduce 
the temperature of any one appointment battle, “prevent the creation of cults of 
personality around the Justices,” and encourage “more minimalistic, narrow, 
deferential decisions.”17 
These goals are important ones, but the Lottery pursues them at a high risk 
of disaster. The basic problem is one of math. Even a perfectly fair lottery across 
a perfectly balanced appellate bench would not produce a balanced Supreme 
Court. Random chance would yield a partisan lineup of 7-2 in more than a sixth 
of all panels, and 6-3 in more than half.18 So the authors add two patches to the 
system: a ﬁve-Justice cap on same-party appointees for each panel, and a 6-3 
supermajority requirement for overturning acts of Congress.19 These are tails 
that wag the dog: the brieﬂy discussed patches are far more important than their 
underlying proposal. 
To start with, the ﬁve-Justice cap means that Justices appointed by different 
Presidents would have different opportunities to serve on the Court, and that 
Democratic and Republican Presidents would have different authorities to staff 
it. Had Adlai Stevenson won the 1952 election, for example, his appointees would 
have competed for the same ﬁve slots with every circuit judge from the previous 
twenty years, while President Eisenhower’s appointees would have waltzed into 
One First Street. Is limiting the Justices’ opportunity to hear cases, depending 
on which Presidents are subsequently elected, consistent with the guarantee that 
they “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour”?20 (Could Congress im-
pose a one-Justice cap for whichever party were out of power?) 
Constitutionality aside, the political consequences of the cap are just as un-
certain. A partisan-balance rule hard-coded for a two-party system can be shat-
tered by the emergence of third parties, or by the borderline-plausible relabeling 
of existing ones. If the GOP rebranded as the “American Party,” it could cam-
paign on a promise of appointing new judges who would be free of the cap, un-
like the still-serving Democratic appointees. President Trump has appointed 
 
16. Id. at 181. 
17. Id. at 183. 
18. See Chance of at Least Seven Heads in Nine Coin Tosses, WOLFRAMALPHA, https:// 
www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=chance+of+at+least+seven+heads+in+nine+coin+tosses 
[https://perma.cc/V7L5-YE4L] (ﬁnding an 8.98% chance for either direction); Chance of at 
Least Six Heads in Nine Coin Tosses, WOLFRAMALPHA, https://www.wolframalpha.com/in-
put/?i=chance+of+at+least+six+heads+in+nine+coin+tosses [https://perma.cc/5JMD 
-D6NJ] (ﬁnding a 25.4% chance for either direction). 
19. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 181-82. 
20. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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roughly a quarter of the federal appellate bench since January 2017,21 so this is 
no minor detail. 
The 6-3 supermajority rule is bolder still, and more likely to violate the Con-
stitution. Congress has power to make laws “necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution” the judicial power,22 as well as to prescribe “Regulations” for the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.23 So Congress can require a quorum for the Court 
to act,24 and maybe it can displace the common-law majority-voting rule, requir-
ing a supermajority to enter orders or to disturb judgments on appeal.25 Yet can 
it pick and choose among different substantive holdings—requiring a supermajor-
ity to express one legal conclusion, but letting a minority of Justices bind the 
Court to another? That would not carry the judicial power into execution, so 
much as control its exercise. Congress can supply statutory rules of decision, but 
it cannot tell the courts what to think about the law.26 (Could the next Congress 
require 9-0 votes to overturn environmental regulations or abortion laws? The 
authors do not say.) 
A supermajority rule is not some neutral intervention that merely gets the 
Court out of our hair. It shifts power to Congress in particular: it privileges federal 
statutes from ordinary judicial review, and it weakens individual rights, along 
with the independent authority of the President and the states. Applying the rule 
to state laws too, as the authors brieﬂy suggest,27 is entirely unworkable: should 
two states claim power over the same question,28 or should both Congress and a 
state do so,29 a 5-4 Court would be unable to rule either way. Even as to federal 
statutes, the rule creates severe incentives for misdirection: a strained constitu-
tional-avoidance holding needs only ﬁve votes, while reading a statute fairly and 
striking it down takes six. A supermajority requirement thus remakes a substan-
tial part of our legal order simply to avoid the unintended consequences of some 
other attempt at reform. And it does much more damage to our traditions of 
 
21. See Carrie Johnson, Trump’s Impact on Federal Courts: Judicial Nominees by the Numbers, NPR 
(Aug. 5, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/05/747013608/trumps-impact-on 
-federal-courts-judicial-nominees-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/SHP5-NDND]. 
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
23. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
25. Cf. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892) (stating “the general rule of all parliamentary 
bodies” that “the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body”); Durant v. Essex Co., 
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1869) (“If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no 
order can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands in full force.”). 
26. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872). 
27. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 182 & n.131. 
28. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt (Hyatt II), 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016). 
29. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights than would the appoint-
ment of a few conservative Justices. 
Is the Lottery worth all this headache? The authors say a randomly chosen 
Court would be more cautious, its Justices cowed by their temporary service.30 
But ephemeral tenure might also encourage the Justices to get their licks in while 
they can—especially on statutory or administrative questions, which are exempt 
from the supermajority rule. Empirical evidence suggests that short time hori-
zons tend to harm cooperation, not help it.31 And appellate judges already pay 
less attention to the views of Justices who have left the bench;32 why would they 
give any more deference to these mayﬂies? A Supreme Court Lottery might pro-
duce narrow and deferential decisions, just as the authors expect; or it might 
produce a judicial goat rodeo, with wild and unpredictable swings in doctrine 
every two weeks. Who can tell? Plans for fundamental government reform 
should not leave this much up to chance. 
i i .  the balanced bench 
The authors’ other proposal is the “Balanced Bench.”33 The Court would 
have ten permanent Justices—ﬁve Democrats and ﬁve Republicans—who would 
invite ﬁve other federal judges to sit by designation for limited terms. Because 
both sides would have to agree, the Justices might choose at least “one moderate 
(or at least ideologically unpredictable) Justice whose vote could break ties”34: 
the second coming, one imagines, of Justice Kennedy. 
The proposal is intriguing, and it might succeed at producing a mushy-mid-
dle Court. (Though who ﬁlls the permanent seats? If a Republican Justice dies 
during a Democratic administration and is replaced with the equivalent of a Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens, all the ideological battles over control of the Court come 
right back.) Even if it works, however, the plan comes with serious costs. Per-
manently labeling certain Justices as Democrats or Republicans—making their 
party membership the very condition of their holding their seats—raises rather 
than lowers the salience of partisanship. It undermines, rather than supports, 
the authors’ “very idea of law itself, as an enterprise separate from politics.”35 
 
30. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 183-84. 
31. Matthew Embrey et al., Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 133 Q.J. ECON. 
509, 511 (2018). 
32. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Georg Vanberg, Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of U.S. 
Supreme Court Decisions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (2016). 
33. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, 193. 
34. Id. at 194. 
35. Id. at 151. 
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Existing partisan-balance requirements have their own issues, but they gen-
erally do not function as political spoils systems. As in the authors’ Lottery pro-
posal, they often cap the number of appointees of the same party.36 This mostly 
works in practice, because neither Republicans nor Democrats really want the 
Greens or the Constitution Party on the Federal Election Commission. But Pres-
idents might be happy to nominate such people to the Supreme Court, where 
they might be even more reliable votes for their ideological bloc. By contrast, re-
quiring ﬁve Democrats and ﬁve Republicans on the Court would render all in-
dependents and minor-party members statutorily ineligible for office. Maybe 
they were unlikely to have been appointed anyway; still, inscribing that require-
ment in statute would offend our traditions of free speech and association. 
Alternatively, the authors suggest requiring the President to choose from lists 
provided by a bipartisan commission or Senate leaders.37 This requirement 
plainly violates the Appointments Clause, letting the commission or the Senate 
seize the President’s power to “nominate . . . Judges of the supreme Court.”38 
The authors note that a similar system is used for some District of Columbia 
courts,39 but that is a non sequitur, as territorial judges do not wield the “judicial 
Power of the United States.”40 Officers of a territorial government may or may 
not be “Officers of the United States,” whom the President has exclusive power 
to nominate.41 But “Judges of the supreme Court” certainly are. 
The authors believe they “have solid responses” to these constitutional ob-
jections.42 Yet they are willing to advance proposals they see as “plausibly consti-
tutional,” notwithstanding the “signiﬁcant risk that the Supreme Court itself 
would strike down reform on constitutional grounds.”43 As constitutional crises 
go, a dispute over the Court’s lawful membership seems like a worst-case 
 
36. E.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) (2018) (“No more than 3 members of the [Federal Election] 
Commission appointed under this paragraph may be affiliated with the same political 
party.”). 
37. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 204. 
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
39. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 204. 
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 
(1828). 
41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 
915 F. 3d 838 (1st Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. June 20, 2019) (No. 18-1334); 
William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (man-
uscript at 15-20), http://ssrn.com/id=3194945; Will Baude, Keeping PROMESA?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 24, 2019, 4:25 PM), https://reason.com/2019/06/24/keeping-promesa 
[https://perma.cc/9UMM-ME7Q]. 
42. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 185. 
43. Id. at 171. 
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scenario: imagine standoffs outside the Court building, contests for the loyalty 
of the Supreme Court Police, and so on. (The authors are uncertain whether the 
old Court or the reformed one would have authority to hear these challenges;44 
if they cannot tell, how will we?) So the authors encourage Congress to add sev-
erability clauses that would pack the Court or strip its jurisdiction if it rules 
against their reforms. In other words, the authors would employ the very devices 
they decry as potentially “damaging the rule of law”45 in order to bludgeon the 
Justices into accepting “constitutional arguments that are less than bullet-
proof.”46 If legitimacy is the goal, this cure seems worse than the disease. 
i i i .  legitimacy 
One might wonder if the game is worth the candle. If saving the Court means 
running such risks, are we sure that the Court needs saving? Is there any “legit-
imacy crisis” at all?47 The authors contend that there is, but their case may fail to 
persuade a reader with different legal or political priors. 
“Legitimacy” is a word of many meanings. The authors are most concerned 
with the Court’s “sociological” legitimacy—the “prevailing public attitudes” to-
ward the Court as an institution,48 and especially the public’s willingness to ac-
cept a judicial settlement of contested issues.49 On one broad review of the em-
pirical literature, however, we simply know very little about what promotes or 
undermines this kind of respect for the courts.50 That weakens the case for rad-
ical reform. 
Indeed, from the available data, it’s hardly clear that the public has lost much 
conﬁdence in the Court. Even after the nominations of Justices Gorsuch and Ka-
vanaugh, polls suggest that trust in the Court has remained largely the same over 
 
44. Id. at 171 n.90. 
45. Id. at 153. 
46. Id. at 171. 
47. Id. at 153. 
48. Id. at 151 n.4 (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 21 (2018)). 
49. Id. at 160-62. 
50. Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, U.S. Supreme Court Legitimacy: Unanswered Questions 
and an Agenda for Future Research, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 132, 141-
44 (Robert M. Howard & Kirk A. Randazzo eds., 2017). 
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the last decade;51 its approval rating may even have gone up.52 Perhaps these 
crude measures overlook deeper trends or longer-term declines—but the past 
thirty years have seen declining trust in many American institutions, and the 
Supreme Court is in better shape than some.53 Regardless, a post-2016 legitimacy 
crisis among the general public ought to show up somewhere in the general data, 
and not just in the channels of liberal opinion.54 
So what explains the sense of crisis that underlies the calls for radical reform? 
Consider a few alternative explanations: 
Partisanship. The current Court is the ﬁrst in many years in which party la-
bels and judicial ideology are fully aligned.55 Yet this is a distinction without a 
difference. Why should one believe, per Lee Epstein and Eric Posner, that the 
Court will now “be seen by the public as a party-dominated institution,”56 if the 
general public has no idea who appointed Justice David Souter, let alone Justice 
James McReynolds? When ordinary Americans think about the 5-4 vote in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller,57 do they remember that two Republican appointees 
were in dissent (Justices Stevens and Souter), or do they just think of the Court 
as split 5-4 along the usual lines? The judicial philosophies are what matter, not 
the party labels. 
 
51. See GALLUP, Conﬁdence in Institutions, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/conﬁdence-institu-
tions.aspx [https://perma.cc/VH2M-5B3Q] (showing, from 2009 to 2019, virtually no 
change in three categories of trust, with a “Great deal” or “Quite a lot” of trust, “Some” trust, 
or “Very little” or “None” moving from 39/41/18 to 38/40/21). 
52. Compare Pew Research Ctr., Supreme Court, US, POLLING THE NATIONS (Jan. 24, 2019), 
http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=polls_05012019.out_992&type=hitlist&num=0 
[https://perma.cc/C4ZN-8Q4K] (demonstrating an approval/disapproval rating of 71/23), 
with Pew Research Ctr., Supreme Court, US, POLLING THE NATIONS (May 21, 2009), 
http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest09.out_16671&type=hitlist&num=33 
[https://perma.cc/KZW2-BYJX] (demonstrating an approval/disapproval rating of 64/21). 
53. Compare, e.g., Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is The Supreme Court Facing a Le-
gitimacy Crisis?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://ﬁvethirtyeight.com 
/features/is-the-supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis [https://perma.cc/V2DC-XW25] 
(showing a decline in trust since late 1980s, based on the data in GALLUP, supra note 51), with 
GALLUP, supra note 51 (showing a substantially greater decline in trust in “[t]he church or 
organized religion”). 
54. Cf. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, 159 n.44 (citing opinion pieces by Bruce Ackerman and 
Erwin Chemerinsky); see also id. (citing Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy 
Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240, 2240 (2019) (reviewing FALLON, supra note 48) (noting 
criticisms leveled by various Democratic officeholders)). 
55. Id. at 156. 
56. Id. (quoting Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can It Be Just?, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court 
-nominee-trump.html [https://perma.cc/L497-C3VE]). 
57. 554 U.S. 570, 572 (2008) (syllabus). 
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Polarization. Judicial philosophies do seem farther apart than in the past. The 
authors fear that the conservative majority will employ “doctrinal theories that 
are at least open to serious question” to “strike down laws that progressives fa-
vor.”58 But as they recognize,59 the main legal question hanging over the Ka-
vanaugh hearings was whether the Court would overturn Roe v. Wade.60 And 
whatever one thinks of its merits, such a decision would presumably employ 
long-familiar theories to uphold various laws.61 By shifting attention to state leg-
islatures, a reversal of Roe seems unlikely to make the Court, at least over the 
long term, “even more of a political focal point than it is right now.”62 In any 
case, one might wonder why the legal academy failed to perceive a similar crisis 
of polarization in 2016, when many people expected a liberal Court, also split 5-4 
on party lines, to use theories “at least open to serious question” to “strike down 
laws” that others favor. Judge Merrick Garland enjoys a moderate reputation, 
but standard measures of ideology show him to be much more liberal than Jus-
tice Kennedy is conservative—leading the New York Times, after his nomination, 
to anticipate “the most liberal Supreme Court in 50 years.”63 Had this come to 
pass, would it not have led “half the country,” as the authors put it, “[to see] the 
majority of Justices as political agents working for the other team”?64 Does po-
larization only matter in one direction? 
Process. The last three conﬁrmation battles were surely unusual. The Senate 
declined, sans hearing, to consent to Judge Garland’s appointment—and then it 
consented, under circumstances of great controversy, to those of Justices Gor-
such and Kavanaugh. To some, what happened in these conﬁrmation proceed-
ings should be taken to invalidate their ultimate outcomes.65 But these were or-
dinary vacancies that had to be ﬁlled, and the Senate’s decisions about how to 
ﬁll them were decisions of substance, as well as of procedure: it had to make a 
judgment about who should hold the office of Associate Justice and about what 
kind of job the nominee might do there. If the Senate’s judgments were wrong, 
even seriously wrong, that might be a ground for passionate objection, but usu-
ally not for charges of illegitimacy. The Senate was surely the proper body to 
 
58. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 168. 
59. Id. at 160-61. 
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
61. Cf. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 
(1973) (presenting some of these theories). 
62. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 161. 
63. Sarah Almukhtar, Why Obama Nominated Merrick Garland for the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/16/us/politics/garland 
-supreme-court-nomination.html [https://perma.cc/8PUY-UAJ5]. 
64. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 155. 
65. See sources cited in Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 157 n.35, 158 n.39. 
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decide, and it was neither bribed nor threatened; the Senators made their choices 
of their own free will, and they had every opportunity to vote “no.” One might 
say that the Senate’s decisions “call[ed] the contending sides of a national con-
troversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted 
in the Constitution.”66 This rhetoric may be convincing to few (as it has been 
before); but if so, what does that tell us about the procedural concerns? 
Pedigree. The authors cite the current Court’s “serious democratic deﬁcits” 
and “lack of democratic pedigree,” which they lay at the feet of the Senate and 
the Electoral College.67 On this argument, the plurality of voters who preferred 
Hillary Clinton, and the majority of voters who chose President Barack Obama, 
were entitled to ﬁll any vacancies with Justices who shared their views. Strangely, 
this argument renders Justice Souter illegitimate too: the majority of voters who 
chose President George H.W. Bush had their deepest judicial preferences frus-
trated by a countermajority of one. If the goal is a Court that “follows th’ iliction 
returns,”68 then Justice Souter would seem a far greater threat to the Court’s 
democratic legitimacy than Senator McConnell—whose maneuvers Justice 
Souter may have indirectly triggered, encouraging Republicans to “make dan-
gerous plays to win the lost point back.”69 
Viewed another way, of course, Justice Souter’s legitimacy is obvious. He was 
appointed by the President with the Senate’s consent; his job was not to support 
anyone’s political program, but to “support this Constitution”70 by his own best 
lights. Yet Justice Souter’s example shows us how hard it is to talk about “legit-
imacy” in isolation from the merits. Had the Justice turned out as his supporters 
had hoped, the 5-4 conservative Court that some now consider a crisis would 
have arrived on schedule in October 1991. One might celebrate or denounce that 
Court for its conservatism, of course, but why would a similar realignment be so 
extraordinary today? It is hard to escape the conclusion that the sense of crisis 
depends on whose ox is gored. 
 
66. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy & 
Souter, JJ.) (plurality opinion). 
67. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 156. 
68. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901). 
69. Ross Douthat, Opinion, David Souter Killed the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/opinion/david-souter-killed-the-ﬁlibuster.html 
[https://perma.cc/CWS5-U6ND]. 
70. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
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iv.  superweapons 
“[L]egitimacy is for losers”71: it helps those on the outs to accept a result and 
live to ﬁght another day. If the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is in crisis, it is be-
cause both sides are increasingly unwilling to take a loss and move on. Their 
ideological distance renders unthinkable the ordinary transfer of power. The 
source of that crisis, however, may well be the aggrandizement of the Court’s 
own inﬂuence, and the fearsome scope of its powers. Tinkering with the Court’s 
machinery will not solve that problem; we need to make those powers less fear-
some to begin with. 
The authors’ discussion of legitimacy reveals a vast intellectual gulf separat-
ing the two sides. Many legal conservatives do not see the current Court as a 
“citadel of justice” ﬂoating “above the political fray,”72 much as they might like 
to. Nor do they see a world in which a “conservative majority was earned using 
underhanded tactics,” in order to “block [the Democrats’] favored policies.”73 
Rather, they see a world in which the other side has engaged in “underhanded 
tactics,” misconstruing the Constitution not to “block their favored policies”—in 
which the other side refuses to “admit defeat” on various projects of constitu-
tional amendment,74 successfully “identifying ideologically reliable nominees”75 
and letting the substance of the Constitution take something of a back seat.76 
This is not to say these conservatives are right. It is to say that claims about 
“legitimacy” in a two-party system count for very little unless they can also be 
seen through the other party’s eyes. Confronted with the fact that Democrats 
have appointed only four Justices in the last ﬁfty years, while the Republicans 
 
71. Nelson & Gibson, supra note 50, at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting James L. 
Gibson, Legitimacy is for Losers: The Interconnections of Institutional Legitimacy, Performance 
Evaluations, and the Symbols of Judicial Authority, in MOTIVATING COOPERATION AND COMPLI-
ANCE WITH AUTHORITY: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 81, 81 (Brian H. Bornstein & 
Alan J. Tomkins eds., 2015). 
72. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 167-68. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 176 (quoting Michael Klarman, Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE 
CARE (Oct. 15, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-su-
preme-court [https://perma.cc/62LV-PBNH]); cf. Barry Cushman, Court-Packing and Com-
promise, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3 (2013) (“[T]here was disagreement within the [Roosevelt] 
administration and in the broader liberal legal community over the form that such an amend-
ment should take, and indeed over whether one should be offered at all. Two years of effort 
by Justice Department lawyers had failed to yield an acceptable proposal.”). 
75. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 193. 
76. Cf. David E. Pozen et al., A Computational Analysis of Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/id=3351339 (manuscript at 48) (“Put (overly) 
simply, Democrats used to dominate constitutional discourse. Now Republicans do.”). 
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(with more fortunate timing) have appointed fourteen,77 many liberals conclude 
that the deck has been stacked against them—that the Supreme Court is actually 
theirs by right. But many conservatives look at the very same numbers (and at 
the judicial records of Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter, among others) and conclude that the deck has been stacked against them: 
the voting booth has proven helpless against the proverbial Georgetown cock-
tail-party circuit, a force just as arbitrary and countermajoritarian as the timing 
of retirements. If both sides believe that the game has been rigged, it is hardly 
surprising that neither wants to play by the rules. 
The modern conservative legal movement was born at a time when the shoe 
was on the other foot, and when many conservatives perceived a crisis of judicial 
legitimacy. Its sense that the Court had gone off the rails was only partly due to 
policy objections to Warren Court rulings—many of which, by the 1980s, had 
already gained broad political acceptance. It was also due to the perception, 
shared even by many outside the movement, that the Court had lost its “inter-
nal”78 legitimacy as a simple matter of legal craft; that its “handiwork in consti-
tutional cases” had not lived up “to the standards of professionalism, responsi-
bility, intellectual coherence, and intellectual honesty that have applied to the 
decisions of courts in the common-law tradition.”79 A Court that rests decisions 
of extraordinary social importance on “the right to deﬁne one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”80 may 
do more to promote the image of “politicians in robes,”81 and to undermine 
“public conﬁdence in the very idea of law itself,”82 than any number of 5-4 deci-
sions. 
As Tara Leigh Grove has pointed out, different kinds of legitimacy may con-
ﬂict with one another.83 Reliably serving up centrist results can trade off with 
actually following the law in a coherent way. Ideological movements will always 
try to put their fellow travelers on the Court, but how much damage they can do 
there partly depends on the Court’s perceived freedom of action, which itself 
partly depends on broader commitments to the rule of law. If the judiciary 
 
77. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 199. 
78. See Grove, supra note 54, at 2249. 
79. H. Jefferson Powell, Further Reﬂections on Not Being “Not an Originalist,” 7 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 288, 293-94 (2010). 
80. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy & 
Souter, JJ.) (plurality opinion). 
81. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 163. 
82. Id. at 151. 
83. See Grove, supra note 54, at 2245; see also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 151 n.4 (discussing 
Grove). 
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appears less clearly bound by legal principle, then it is harder to avoid the sense 
(increasingly common among partisans on both sides) that ﬁve Justices could 
conceivably adopt any position on any issue, and that “the legislatures’ judg-
ments will matter not a bit.”84 
Control of the Court might then seem more important than control of the 
nuclear codes; it would be a superweapon too powerful ever to be entrusted to 
the other side. That is why threats of court-packing are so tempting, and so dan-
gerous: because they envision a Court without rules, through which a deter-
mined party with possession of Congress and the White House can do anything 
it wants. And those who oppose the ruling party—who would have neither the 
guarantees of a written Constitution nor the traditions of a parliamentary system 
to protect them—will feel entitled, or even obliged, to do anything to stop it. Why 
“feel compelled to let the Court block [your] favored policies for a generation or 
more,”85 when only a few measly norms stand in the way? 
To some legal conservatives, this too might seem familiar. Not long after Ca-
sey, the religious journal First Things held a symposium on “The End of Democ-
racy.”86 Having watched the pro-life movement win three successive presidential 
elections, only to be defeated 5-4 at the Court, the editors asked whether a regime 
that no longer ruled “by the consent of the governed” had lost its claim to legit-
imacy and should be opposed by extralegal means.87 These impulses were even-
tually quieted, in part by a conviction that there was still a path forward, and 
that it was “better to accept the system’s basic legitimacy and work within it for 
change than to take steps, violent or otherwise, that risk blowing the entire ap-
paratus up.”88 Similar conclusions might take hold today. Norms can strengthen 
as well as erode; having peered over the edge of the abyss, we might choose to 
take a few steps back. 
In that effort to restore legitimacy, legal conservatives might have a few ideas 
to offer. Given the depth of our country’s polarization, maybe we should require 
less by way of social agreement, relying somewhat more on private ordering and 
reducing the number of questions that the political process needs to answer. 
Maybe we should reduce the scope of that process, encouraging working agree-
ments by different parts of the country when consensus is lacking in the whole. 
 
84. Hewitt, supra note 5. 
85. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 11, at 168. 
86. Symposium, The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 
1996, at 18. 
87. Id. at 18, 19. 
88. Ross Douthat, Opinion, An Election Is Not a Suicide Mission, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/opinion/campaign-stops/from-roe-to-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/DQ6W-DGKG]. 
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And maybe, to reduce the threat of the Supreme-Court-as-superweapon—capa-
ble of vaporizing any target that shows up in the Justices’ gunsights—we should 
precommit to limiting the Court’s freedom of action, binding it to some discrete 
set of preexisting rules until there is a very broad consensus for changing them. 
(We could even write those rules down on a piece of paper, to be kept in the 
National Archives—and change them only by agreement of, say, two-thirds of 
each House of Congress, and some three-fourths or so of the states.) 
Limited government, federalism, originalism, and so on may seem like na-
ïve—and convenient—solutions to a bipartisan legitimacy crisis. And perhaps 
they are. But the Constitution was not designed for a nation of high-school civics 
teachers, full of corny enthusiasm for powdered wigs and tricorn hats. It was 
adopted for, and repeatedly amended by, those who had lived through civil war, 
economic crisis, and profound moral disagreement (over human slavery, among 
other topics). If, today, in circumstances of relative peace and plenty, our disa-
greements seem too great for us to bear, perhaps we should think more about 
the devices they used to make bad compromises when the alternatives seemed 
even worse. 
conclusion 
If the Supreme Court needs saving—a doubtful proposition to begin with—
it will be saving from itself, and from too broad a conception of its own legal 
omnipotence. These problems will not be solved by technical quick-ﬁxes or in-
stitutional restructuring. Despite Justice Kennedy’s hopes, the Court on its own 
cannot end national divisions or reconcile the contending sides. We will have to 
do that instead. 
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